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Acts, which were enacted for the benefit of the highway victim. The
General Assembly might well consider changing this rule based
purely upon legal reasoning without sufficient regard to practical
considerations.
JOHN BRYAN WHITLEY
Oral Contracts to Devise Realty-Right of Third Party Beneficiary
to Recover on Quantum Meruit
In North Carolina an oral contract to devise real property is
void under the Statute of Frauds,' and part performance by the
promisee will not remove the contract from the operation of the
Statute.2 However, the promisee who performs services pursuant to
such a contract has a remedy on implied assumpsit or quantum meruit
to recover the value of the services rendered.'
Pickelsimer v. Pickelsimer4 presented the question of whether
the third party beneficiary of a contract that is void under the Statute
of Frauds may recover on quantum meruit the value of services ren-
dered by the promisee pursuant to the contract. In this case the
father of an illegitimate child had orally promised the child's mother
that he would devise and bequeath to the child a one-fifth part of his
estate if she would refrain from instituting bastardy proceedings
out in the HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS
ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 218 (1955), provides: "(a) Except as otherwise
provided in this Act, where two or more persons become jointly or severally
liable in tort for the same injury to person or property or for the same
wrongful death, there is a right of contribution among them even though
judgment has not been recovered against all or any of then .... (d) A
tortfeasor who enters into a settlement with a claimant is not entitled to
recover contribution from another tortfeasor whose liability for the injury
or wrongful death is not extinguished by the settlement nor in respect to any
amount paid in a settlement which is in excess of what was reasonable."
(Emphasis added.)
IN.C. GEN. STAT. § 22-2 (1953).
2 Duckett v. Harrison, 235 N.C. 145, 69 S.E.2d 176 (1952); Ebert v.
Disher, 216 N.C. 36, 3 S.E.2d 301 (1939); Grantham v. Grantham, 205 N.C.
363, 171 S.E. 331 (1933); Albea v. Griffin, 22 N.C. 9 (1838). Part per-
formance by the promisee will remove the oral contract from the operation
of the Statute in all but three states. E.g., Betterly v. Granger, 350 Mich.
651, 87 N.W.2d 330 (1957); Holt v. Alexander, 207 Okla. 140, 248 P.2d 228
(1952); Patton v. Patton, 201 Va. 705, 112 S.E.2d 849 (1960). See gen-
erally RESTATEMENT, CoNTRACTs § 197 (1932); 1 PAGE, WILLs § 10.13 (Bowe-
Parker rev. 1960).
Gales v. Smith, 249 N.C. 263, 106 S.E.2d 164 (1958); Daughtry v.
Daughtry, 223 N.C. 528, 27 S.E.2d 446 (1943); Grantham v. Grantham,
supra note 2.
'257 N.C. 696, 127 S.E.2d 557 (1962).
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against him and perform certain domestic services. The father died
having breached his promise.' The child sued her father's estate for
damages for breach of the oral contract to devise or, alternatively,
on quantum neruit for the reasonable value of services performed
by the mother pursuant to the contract. The North Carolina Su-
preme Court held that the plaintiff's action for breach of the oral
contract to devise was barred by the Statute of Frauds,6 and that no
recovery could be had on quantum reruit because "it was her
mother who performed the services-not the plaintiff."'7
The court recognized the right of a third party to enforce a con-
tract made for his benefit.' However, the court pointed 6ut that
since this right is necessarily dependent upon the existence of a valid
contract,9 it could not arise from an oral contract that is void under
the Statute of Frauds. In determining that the plaintiff was not en-
titled to recover on quantum meruit, the court stated:
While the law will not permit one person to take the labor
of another without compensation when it was performed and
received in expectation of payment, it does not follow as a
corollary that a third-party beneficiary under a void contract
can recover for labor which another performed, even though
such labor provided the consideration for the void contract.1"
It is believed that the principal case marks the first direct deter-
mination of a third party beneficiary's rights on quantum meruit
in any jurisdiction. 1 Notwithstanding the novelty of the question
'The complaint alleged the value of a one-fifth part of the father's estate
to be approximately $250,000.00. By her father's will, the child was be-
queathed the sum of $1,000.00, plus $75.00 a month until she reached the age
of eighteen.
' "An indivisible oral contract to devise both real and personal property
is also void." 257 N.C. at 698, 127 S.E.2d at 559. Accord, McCraw v.
Llewellyn, 256 N.C. 213, 123 S.E.2d 575 (1962); Humphrey v. Faison, 247
N.C. 127, 100 S.E.2d 524 (1957).257 N.C. at 703, 127 S.E.2d at 563.8Accord, Brown v. Bowers Constr. Co., 236 N.C. 462, 73 S.E.2d 147
(1952) ; Canestrino v. Powell, 231 N.C. 190, 56 S.E.2d 566 (1949).
' See Lammonds v. Aleo Mfg. Co., 243 N.C. 749, 92 S.E.2d 143 (1956).
See generally RESTATRMENT, CONTRACTS § 140 (1932); 4 CORBIN, CONTRACTS
§ 818 (1951); 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 364A (3d ed. 1959).
10257 N.C. at 704, 127 S.E.2d at 563.
' The research for this note has disclosed no cases in which the third
party beneficiary of a void contract was denied the right to recover the value
of services rendered by the promisee pursuant to the contract. However, in
Graham v. Graham, 134 App. Div. 777, 119 N.Y. Supp. 1013 (1909), the
defendant had orally agreed with the plaintiff to convey land to a third per-
son in consideration of services to be performed by the plaintiff. The
19631
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presented, the court was compelled to deal extensively with cases
supporting the plaintiff's position.
One such case was Redmon v. Roberts.'2  In Redmon, the father
of an illegitimate child had orally promised the child's mother that,
if she would refrain from instituting bastardy proceedings against
him, he would devise the child a share of his estate equal to that of
his other children. When the father died intestate, the child sued
his estate for breach of the oral contract to devise. In answer to the
defendant's contention that recovery was barred by the Statute of
Frauds, the court, citing prior North Carolina cases, 13 stated, "this
Court and Courts generally have upheld and enforced oral contracts
to devise or convey land in consideration of services rendered."' 4
The plaintiff, a third party beneficiary, was permitted to recover.
In Pickelsimer the court, in overruling Redmon, pointed out that
the general proposition announced there was not sustained by the
North Carolina cases' 5 cited in support thereof. Indeed, in none of
the cases cited in Redmon did the court uphold and enforce the oral
contract to devise or convey. Rather, the defendant was compelled
to pay the reasonable value of what he had received on the theory
that it would be inequitable to allow the defendant to repudiate the
oral contract and at the same time retain benefits derived thereunder
at the expense of the plaintiff.
Two Kentucky cases 6 were also cited in support of the general
proposition announced in Redmon. In each case, the father of an
plaintiff fully performed and, upon repudiation of the contract by the de-
fendant, brought an action to recover the reasonable value of his services.
Apparently speaking to the defense that the action lay in the third party,
the New York court stated: "In the case at bar the premises were not to be
conveyed to the promisee, but to a third party. But, the agreement was
unenforceable because not written. There was no contract, therefore, upon
which the beneficiary could sue. To the promisee alone is raised the implied
contract to repay the value of the services rendered in performance of the
voidable parol contract, which the promisor afterwards refused to perform."
Id. at 779, 119 N.Y. Supp. at 1014.
12 198 N.C. 161, 150 S.E. 881 (1929).
Brown v. Williams, 196 N.C. 247, 145 S.E. 233 (1928) ; Deal v. Wil-
son, 178 N.C. 600, 101 S.E. 205 (1919); McCurry v. Purgason, 170 N.C. 463,
87 S.E. 244 (1915); Faircloth v. Kenlaw, 165 N.C. 228, 81 S.E. 299 (1914);
Lipe v. Houck, 128 N.C. 115, 38 S.E. 297 (1901); Whetstine v. Wilson, 104
N.C. 384, 10 S.E. 471 (1889).
1, 198 N.C. at 164, 150 S.E. at 883.
15 See cases cited note 13 supra.
1" Bowling v. Bowling's Adm'r, 222 Ky. 396, 300 S.W. 876 (1927) ; Doty's
Adm'r v. Doty's Guardian, 118 Ky. 204, 80 S.W. 803 (1904). These two
cases were based on the prior case of Benge v. Hiatts Adm'r, 82 Ky. 666(1885).
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illegitimate child had orally promised the child's mother, in consid-
eration of her surrender of custody or her forbearance to institute
bastardy proceedings against him, that he would give land to the
child or make him an equal heir with his other children. The father,
having received the promised consideration, breached his promise.
The child brought suit in each case to enforce the father's oral
promise. The Kentucky Court of Appeals held the promises un-
enforceable under the Statute of Frauds, but allowed the plaintiff to
recover the value of the property orally promised because the mother's
performance could not be accurately valued in monetary terms.'7
These cases were particularly favorable to the plaintiff's position
in Pickelsimer, since Kentucky, at the time the cases were decided,
was one of the small minority of states, including North Carolina,
which did not recognize the doctrine of part performance.' 8  Never-
theless, the court refused to follow the Kentucky cases, pointing out
that in neither opinion had the Kentucky court mentioned the fact
that the plaintiff, a third party beneficiary of an unenforceable con-
"
7 Kentucky, in a long line of decisions, had fashioned a unique measure of
damages for the situation in which the services rendered were not adaptable
to accurate monetary evaluation. In such a situation, the measure of dam-
ages was deemed as a matter of law to be the value of the promised realty.
Walker v. Dill's Adm'r 186 Ky. 638, 218 S.W. 247 (1920); Waters v. Cline,
121 Ky. 611, 85 S.W. 209 (1905). Kentucky, in the recent case of Miller
v. Miller, 335 S.W.2d 884 (Ky. 1960), has apparently abandoned the rule.
See note 18 infra. In Redmon v. Roberts, 198 N.C. 161, 150 S.E. 881(1929), the North Carolina court uttered a dictum approving the trial
court's application of this standard. It may have been followed in Hager v.
Whitener, 204 N.C. 747, 169 S.E. 645 (1933), although it-is difficult to de-
termine whether the recovery in that case was limited to the value of the
plaintiff's services. It was dealt with and disapproved in Grantham v. Gran-
tham, 205 N.C. 363, 171 S.E. 331 (1933), though it has been suggested that
the facts of that case would not warrant interpreting the court's treatment
to be an express repudiation. See Note, 39 N.C.L. REv. 98 (1960). If the
Grantham case did not operate as an express repudiation of the rule, it is
believed that there is language in the principal case sufficient to prevent its
adoption in North Carolina in the near future.
18 Doty's Adm'r v. Doty's Guardian, 118 Ky. 204, 80 S.W. 803 (1904). In
Miller v. Miller, supra note 17, the Kentucky court may have adopted the
doctrine of part performance. The plaintiff, a third party beneficiary of a
contract within the statute of frauds, was permitted to recover the promised
realty. Theretofore, when the value of services rendered pursuant to the
oral contract was impossible of monetary evaluation, the person suing had
been permitted to recover the value of the promised realty as a matter of
law. See note 17 supra. Whether Miller should be interpreted as placing
Kentucky among those states which recognize the doctrine of part perform-
ance is questionable, since nowhere in the opinion is the doctrine mentioned,
and it is not certain that the same result would be reached in cases where the
services are possible of monetary evaluation. For further reflection on the
Kentucky position, see 50 Ky. L.J. 220 (1961).
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tract, was recovering on quantum reruit. Indeed, in one of the
cases, the Kentucky court implied that the plaintiff was recovering
for breach of the oral contract, although in the same case it held the
oral contract unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds.'0
With Redmon and the Kentucky cases disposed of, the court then
had to decide whether or not the law will imply a promise on the
part of one who receives services from another to pay their reason-
able value to a third person. This question was partially resolved
by reference to the measure of damages in a quantum meruit action.
The court stated that recovery on quantum meruit "is always on the
basis of the reasonable value of the services rendered by the one and
accepted by the other, less any benefits received by the one." 20  It was
reasoned that since the plaintiff had not rendered the services, the
law would not imply a promise to pay her their reasonable value. In-
stead, if any action on quantum meruit arose from the facts of the
principal case, it belonged to the mother who had rendered the
services.
The principal case reflects a desire to eliminate the confusion en-
gendered by the loose language employed and the result achieved in
the Redmon case. An analysis of that case would indicate that a quan-
tum meruit recovery is predicated on the oral contract to devise,
subject only to a limitation on the amount of damages recoverable.
Such a position would be wholly inimical to the Statute of Frauds,
since the policy of that Statute dictates that no agreement to devise
realty, whether express or implied in fact, can be enforced unless
1 In Doty's Adm'r v. Doty's Guardian, supra note 18, the defendant con-
tended that no recovery could be had on the contract since it contemplated
future illicit relations between the mother and the father. The Kentucky
court, in answering this contention, stated: "If this were a suit by the mother
for her services we have no question the principle should be applied, but it
is not a suit for her services. It is a suit by the child." Id. at 219, 80 S.W.
at 807. (Emphasis added.) The court held the oral contract unenforceable,
pointing out that part performance would not cure the result, and then
stated: "The contract is not otherwise within the statute of frauds, and while
appellee can not be adjudged the land, the value of the thing promised may
be estimated, and compensation for the breach of the contract may be ad-
judged ... ." Id. at 220, 80 S.W. at 808. (Emphasis added.) The language
employed and the result achieved in this and other Kentucky cases lead this
writer to wonder whether Kentucky is not actually allowing an action for
breach of the oral contract to devise subject to a special measure of damages
to vindicate the policy behind the statute of frauds.
20 257 N.C. at 704, 127 S.E.2d at 563. Accord, Doub v. Hauser, 256 N.C.




reduced to writing. Thus, in recent cases,21 the court has been
careful to point out that a quantum meruit recovery is not based on
the oral agreement between the parties, but rather on a contract which
the law implies to prevent unjust enrichment. If this theoretical
distinction is actually sustained in practice, then the principal case
would appear to be beyond question.
The court in Pickelsimer was faced essentially with the question
of whether or not there may be a third party beneficiary of a con-
tract implied in law. Ordinarily, the right of a third party to main-
tain an action on a contract is dependent on the manifest intention
of the parties to the contract to benefit the third party thereby.22 On
the other hand, a contract implied in law arises wholly without regard
to the intentions of the parties. Instead, it arises from the equities of
a particular situation. It is not a contract at all in the true sense,
but rather a legal fiction created by the court as a means for vindi-
cating the policy against unjust enrichment.23 If the intention of
the parties does not control the creation of the contract implied in
law, then the requisite intent for the creation of third party rights
would also be lacking. Nothing else appearing, when one has re-
ceived services from another under circumstances which permit the
inference that the recipient intended to pay and the other party
expected compensation for the services, the law will not imply a
promise to pay their reasonable value to a stranger.
Yet, it is not altogether clear from the cases that the only con-
tract being enforced in the quantum meruit situation is the contract
implied in law. In the absence of some agreement between the
parties, it would be difficult to prove facts giving rise to a contract
implied in law. Accordingly, evidence of the oral contract is admis-
sible to show facts and circumstances permitting the inference that
payment for the services was intended on the one hand and expected
on the other.24 Such evidence may also be used to rebut any pre-
sumption that the services were rendered gratuitiously.25 Though
evidence of the oral contract for these two purposes would be suffi-
"
1E.g., Stewart v. Wyrick, 228 N.C. 429, 45 S.E.2d 764 (1947).
"' See Traders Land Co. v. Abbott Realty Co., 207 N.C. 453, 177 S.E. 335
(1934).23Hunsucker v. High Point Bending & Chair Co., 237 N.C. 559, 75
S.E.2d 768 (1953); Queen v. DeHart, 209 N.C. 414, 184. S.E. 7 (1936);
Montgomery v. Lewis, 187 N.C. 577, 122 S.E. 374 (1924).
' Gales v. Smith, 249 N.C. 263, 106 S.E.2d 164 (1958); Nesbitt v.
Donoho, 198 N.C. 147, 150 S.E. 875 (1929).
"
5 Wells v. Foreman, 236 N.C. 351, 72 S.E.2d 765 (1952).
1963]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
cient to establish facts giving rise to the contract implied in law, the
use of such evidence is not limited to these purposes. Indeed, the
contract price is admissible as evidence, though not conclusive, of
the reasonable value of the services. 6 It has been observed that use
of the contract price, notwithstanding proper instructions to the
jury, may result in enforcement of the oral contract itself.2 7 Cer-
tainly, in cases where the promisee has fully performed and the
services are not susceptible of monetary evaluation, the contract
price might well be the only evidence on this subject for the jury to
consider.
Heretofore, the court has been confronted with the situation in
which only two parties were involved-the promisor and the promisee
of the oral contract. In that situation, the only question to be de-
cided is whether the law implies a promise from the promisor to the
promisee to pay the reasonable value of the services. It would never
be contended that payment should go to anyone other than the
promisee who rendered the services, since no other parties are in-
volved. Even if there is a third party beneficiary of the oral con-
tract, this result should not be altered if the terms of the oral con-
tract are excluded from consideration in this determination. But
,once the terms of the oral contract are admitted to show circum-
:stances permitting the inference that the services are to be paid for,
" When the defendant has promised to devise the plaintiff specific property
:in consideration of the services, the value of the property is admissible as
*some indication of what the parties deemed the services to be worth. In
-Grantham v. Grantham, 205 N.C. 363, 171 S.E. 331 (1933), the oral promise
-was to devise and bequeath all the property which the promisor might own at
,her death. The court held the value of the estate to be admissible as some
,evidence, though not conclusive, of the value of the services. Accord, Norton
'v. McLelland, 208 N.C. 137, 179 S.E. 443 (1935); Deal v. Wilson, 178 N.C.(600, 101 S.E. 205 (1919); Faircloth v. Kenlaw, 165 N.C. 228, 81 S.E. 299
(1914). But cf. Doub v. Hauser, 256 N.C. 331, 123 S.E.2d 821 (1962),
where the defendant promised to devise the plaintiff "his share of the farm."
The plaintiff attempted to introduce the value of the defendant's estate as
some evidence of the value of the services rendered. The court held the
evidence inadmissible for this purpose. Accord, Sawyer v. Weskett, 201
N.C. 500, 160 S.E. 575 (1931). Conceivably, had the tendered evidence
been limited to the value of "his share of the farm," it would have been
admissible. See generally ANNOT., 65 A.L.R.2d 945 (1959).
27 "While this rule purports to fix the amount of compensation, it prac-
tically overrules the statute of frauds; since the jury will ordinarily fail to
discriminate between evidence of the contract as an enforceable obligation,
and evidence of the contract to show what reasonable compensation is." 4
PAGE, WILLS § 10.29 (Bowe-Parker rev. 1961). See also 2 CORBIN, CoN-
TRAcTs § 328 (1950).
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should they not also be admitted to show circumstances permitting
the inference that payment is to be made to a third party?
Two writers, in anticipating the question presented, have ex-
pressed conflicting views as to the result achieved in the principal
case. Professor Williston prescribes the view adopted by Pickel-
sirner,8 whereas Professor Corbin apparently approves the decisions
in Redmon and the Kentucky cases.29  Neither writer gives reasons
for his view. It is believed that if the court's announced policy
against enforcing the oral contract is actually realized in the quantum
mneruit situation, the result in the principal case is desirable. But if,
as assumed in Redmon, the court is actually enforcing the oral con-
tract subject only to a limitation on the amount of damages recover-
able, then, perhaps, it is somewhat arbitrary to deny recovery to the
third party beneficiary solely on the ground that she did not render
the services.
WILLIAM E. SHINN, JR.
28 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1455A (rev. ed. 1937). The same result
is prescribed by implication in RESTATEmENT, CONTRACTS § 356 (2), comment
b (1932).
"4 Copi.n, CONTRAcTS § 810 n.1 (1951).
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